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ABSTRACT
We measure monetary policy shocks as changes in the Fed funds target rate that surprise bond
markets in daily data. These shock series avoid the omitted variable, time-varying parameter, and
orthogonalization problem of monthly VARs, and do not impose the expectations hypothesis. We find
surprisingly large and persistent responses of bond yields to these shocks. 10 year rates rise as much as
8/10 of a percent to a one percent target shock. The usual view that monetary policy only temporarily
raises long term rates and influences inflation would lead one to predict a negative long rate response.
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This paper studies monetary policy shocks, deﬁned from Fed Funds target movements
relative to daily interest rate data. These shocks are nearly ideal measures of unexpected
movements in monetary policy. Market expectations can summarize the vast amount of
i n f o r m a t i o nu s e db yt h eF e di ns e t t i n gp o l i c y ,a n du s e db yF e dw a t c h e r si ng u e s s i n gt h e
Fed’s actions, thus surmounting the omitted variables problem in estimated policy rules.
Interest rate forecasts can adapt to changes in the Fed’s reactions to the rest of the economy
— the time-varying parameter problem. If in one year the Fed worries about inﬂation, but in
another year it places more weight on unemployment, market forecasts will adapt, but VAR
regressions may not, and incorrectly interpret anticipated actions to be shocks.
Finally, high frequency data surmount painlessly the pervasive orthogonalization prob-
lem. Interest rates all move together. Does this movement reﬂect Fed reaction to interest
rates, or interest rate reactions to the Fed? Neither recursive identiﬁcation is plausible for
monthly data. Fed oﬃcials obviously look at interest rates just before the FOMC meeting,
and just as obviously, interest rates react immediately to any change in funds target. By con-
trast, the one-day correlation between a target change an interest rate changes is obviously
not a Fed reaction to intra-day interest rate news.
Orthogonalization matters a lot in monthly data. If one orthogonalizes the funds rate
before other interest rates, one estimates that policy shocks have a strong, “level” eﬀect on
other interest rates. If one orthogonalizes with the funds rate after other interest rates, one
recovers an idiosyncratic funds rate movement that does not aﬀect other rates. The eﬀect of
the funds shock on long term interest rates is entirely determined by the orthogonalization.
1Following this attractive intuition, Glenn Rudebusch (1998) and others have used Fed
funds futures data and the expectations hypothesis that the futures rate is equal to the
expected future spot rate to deﬁne an expected fed funds target, and thus a shock. Alas,
the institutional details of the funds rate and its futures market make this approach more
complex than it seems. Also, the expectations hypothesis is currently most famous for the
failure of the forward-spot spread to forecast interest rate changes. Finally, this approach is
limited to a sample since Fed funds futures were introduced in 1988.
With these thoughts in mind, we follow Monika Piazzesi (2001) in deﬁning shocks from
interest rates more generally, and without imposing the expectations hypothesis. We use two
approaches. First, we run a regression of target rate changes on interest rates just before
the target change. Second, we deﬁne the shock as the change in the 1 month Eurodollar
rate from just before to just after the target change. Both measures use the fact that there
has been a target rate change; they omit from the shocks all dates on which the funds rate
might have been expected to change, but it did not. Throwing out shocks need not bias
responses, and we suspect that the response to unexpected target changes is diﬀerent from
the response to target changes expected by some (usually overparameterized) regression that
did not happen.
We are especially interested in the eﬀect of target changes on interest rates. Target
changes seem to be accompanied by large changes in long-term interest rates, and many
estimates support this correlation (Our own estimates include John Cochrane 1989 and
Piazzesi 2001, Figure 3). This eﬀect is puzzling. Why do 30 year bond yields not decline on
funds rate shocks? Tight monetary policy should lead to lower inﬂation, which should lower
long-term bond yields. Can the Fed really raise the real short rate 1% for 5 years or more,
without leading to 1% lower inﬂation that would cancel any eﬀect on longer yields?
2Charles Evans and David Marshall (1998) look at interest rate responses to the shocks
identiﬁed by Lawrence Christiano, Martin Eichenbaum, and Charles Evans (1996). These
shocks are residuals in a carefully orthogonalized monthly VAR. They ﬁnd that these CEE
shocks only have “slope” eﬀects on interest rates, and do not move long rates much. Since
“level” shocks dominate the variance of long rates, their view implies that the bulk of interest
rate movements is explained by the systematic component of policy. Evans and Marshall
impose that interest rates do not forecast the Federal funds rate either at lags or contempo-
raneously. Thus, their responses are the same as regressions of interest rates on unmodiﬁed
CEE shocks. One of our prime questions is whether allowing interest rates to forecast the
funds target changes their conclusions.
II. A revealing episode
Figure 1 presents Federal funds target changes, the 1 month Eurodollar rate, and long
term treasury yields through 2001. (Our data are all taken from the New York Fed website,
release H.15, and target data augmented by Glenn Rudebusch. Eurodollar rates are recorded
at 9:30 am Eastern time, while the other data are recorded at the end of the day, so we assign
the Eurodollar rates to the previous day.) The top panel of Figure 1 instantly suggests which
target changes were anticipated and which were unanticipated. The changes on January 3,
April 18 and September 17 all took the 1 month Eurodollar rate by surprise. In fact, on
January 3 the 1 month rate fell more than the target. The market may have inferred that
another cut was coming soon. On the other hand, the changes on Jan 31, May 15 and Aug
21 were completely and exactly anticipated by the one month rate. On Mar 20 and Jun
27, the 1 month rate actually rose slightly on the target cut. Apparently, markets expected
a larger cut, so the “shock” was positive rather than negative. On Oct 2 and Nov 6, the
market had anticipated a good part but not all of the change. We could read these as some
3chance of a change, which then happened. In this graph, as in the larger sample, most target
changes seem completely expected by bond markets, suggesting that many conventionally
measured shocks (i.e. from monthly VARs) are anticipated.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 strongly suggests that unexpected target moves aﬀect long
term rates. For example, around the 50 bp target rate change on Jan 3, the 1 and 3 year
rates fell 70 bp, and the 5 year rate about 50. The natural interpretation is that the cut
signaled a change of direction; in the place of further tightening, there would be further rate
cuts. If the average shock has a smaller impact on long term rates (as found by Evans and
Marshall 1998, for example), the average shock must be more transitory, or anticipated but
misclassiﬁe da sas h o c ki nam o n t h l yr e g r e s s i o n .
The response of yields to shocks is quite consistent over maturities. When the 1 month
rate in the top half of the ﬁgure is surprised, so are the long rates in the bottom half, and
conversely when the 1 month rate is not surprised, neither are the long rates.
September 17 is a particularly interesting target change. The terrorist attack was on
Tuesday Sept 11. Bond markets reopened Thursday Sept 13. The one and three year rates
dropped 50 bp. The natural interpretation is that the markets correctly anticipated that on
Monday Sept 17, the Fed would lower the target 50 bp. That is exactly what the Fed did,
and yields did not move on that news. Now, is this a shock, or an expected movement? A
monthly VAR would count it as a shock. But the target move was clearly taken in response
to events, and to a threat that output will otherwise decline. It should not count as a shock,
and our measure does not do so.
III. Shocks from daily data
Figure 1 naturally suggests that we use the change in the 1 month Eurodollar rate
surrounding the target change to measure its unexpected component. Detailed inspection
4of some of the target changes shows interest rate movements the day before target rate
changes, which may reﬂect dating errors. For this reason, we deﬁne the interest rate move
corresponding to the shock as the move from 2 days before to one day after the change, and
our regression forecast of target changes uses data 2 days before the change.
Table 1 presents regressions of interest rates on these target shocks. The relation between
interest rates and unexpected target changes is clearly much stronger and more consistent
than the relation between interest rates and raw target changes. The size of the coeﬃcients
is particularly startling. A 1% unexpected target change aﬀects Treasury yields by 60-70 bp
all the way out to 5 years, and 52 bp at a 10 year maturity!
We also measure policy shocks from a more conventional target forecasting regression.
We started with a regression of target changes on all yields, but with many similar coeﬃcients
and small t-statistics, we iteratively eliminated the variables with the smallest t-statistics
to end up with the simpler and more interpretable form given in the table. The R2 only
declines from 0.66 to 0.64 as we exclude yields. Table 2 presents our ﬁnal regression.
Table 2 gives a strong and appealing message. First, there is some slow mean reversion,
s h o w ni nt h ec o e ﬃcient on the target. Second, and interestingly given the visual appeal of
Figure 1, the long-term rates are far more important than the short-term rates in forecast-
ing Fed moves. (In the regression with all yields, the 1 month Eurodollar had a coeﬃcient
of -0.06 and a t-statistic of -0.8.) This ﬁnding contradicts expectations hypothesis logic,
which suggests that the shortest possible interest rate should be the best forecaster of tar-
get changes. It suggests instead that interest rates forecast target moves because the Fed
responds to expected inﬂation information embodied in long rates, as suggested by Taylor
rules, especially as speciﬁed by Richard Clarida, Jordi Gali and Mark Gertler (2000). Third,
the spread between the 2 and 5 year rate is the most important target forecasting variable
5of all. This spread is a potent forecaster of real activity, which naturally suggests the output
component of a Taylor rule. However, as in Piazzesi (2001), these interest rate regressions
far outperform conventional Taylor rules in forecasting the target.
IV. Monthly shocks and responses
To construct monthly impulse-response functions, we sum up the daily shock series. For
comparison purposes, we construct monthly CEE shocks. The VAR consists of nonfarm
employment, the cpi, the commodity price index, and the fed funds rate. We orthogonalize
shocks recursively in that order, and estimate the VAR with 6 monthly lags.
Our shock series is zero in a month with no target changes, and many target changes are
almost completely anticipated. As a result, and especially in the latter half of the sample,
we see few shocks. Inference from VAR shocks after about 1990 is dominated by expected
movements that don’t happen, rather than by unexpected movements that do. The two
high-frequency measures also see the early 1990s rate declines and the recovery after 1994
as largely positive shocks, while the CEE measure shows positive and negative shocks.
To calculate the impulse response for horizon j, we run single regressions of the changes
in variables on the policy shocks, yt+j − yt on εt+1. We follow this procedure since we
cannot include all the state variables (interest rates on the day before a target change) in
the autoregressive representation of the VAR. Ita l s oh a sav e r yn i c ei n t u i t i o n .T h ei m p u l s e
response function is after all a summary of the experience of the target variable following
a shock. This procedure is consistent, and gives results quite similar to the autoregressive
simulation when applied to the CEE VAR.
Figure 2 contrasts responses of output and CPI to our shocks and to CEE VAR shocks.
Our shocks show employment rising following a target shock, while employment declines
slowly following a CEE shock. The diﬀerence results from a diﬀerent interpretation of interest
6rate movements as expected vs. unexpected, and thus a diﬀerent view of output episodes.
CEE shocks count months around the 1987 stock market crash as much larger negative shocks
than the daily measures. and the daily measures see larger negative shocks in early 1991.
Alas, neither set of responses is statistically signiﬁcant, as found by CEE in this sample.
This is unfortunate — all of our information about the output eﬀects of monetary policy
comes from interpretation of the 1979-1982 experience.
The two high-frequency shocks give quite diﬀe r e n ta n s w e r sa b o u ti n ﬂation. The one
month Eurodollar shock agrees with the CEE shock that monetary policy has nearly no eﬀect
on inﬂation. The regression shock shows a large, though dubiously signiﬁcant, increase in
inﬂation following a shock. However, the standard errors are large enough that we basically
conclude that there is no inﬂation response. This is also troubling. Fed funds shocks should
lower inﬂation, but as in larger samples, there is no evidence that they do so.
Figure 3 plots the instantaneous (one month) responses of yields to the target shock. Both
high frequency shocks produce ﬂatter yield curve responses, and notably larger changes at
the long end of the yield curve. As we found in the daily data, the measure based on the one
month Euro rates produces a very large response. The 10 year rate rises by 0.8 percentage
points when the funds target rises one percent, in contrast to 0.2 percentage points for the
CEE shock. The fact that funds shocks do not lower inﬂation, and in fact seem to raise
inﬂation, is consistent with the ﬁnding that funds shocks raise long-term rates.
Figure 4 presents the dynamic responses of yields to the regression shock and the CEE
shock. (The Eurodollar shock produces results quite similar to the regression shock.) Here
too, the high frequency shocks produce quite diﬀerent response functions. After a blip at 6
months, all interest rates keep rising following a shock. By contrast, the CEE VAR shock
produces a quite short lived response.
7VI. Concluding remarks
We construct measures of monetary policy shocks from target rate changes that surprise
bond markets in daily data. The “rule” we estimate is sensible: the Fed responds to long
term interest rates, perhaps embodying inﬂation expectations, and to the slope of the term
structure, which forecasts real activity. Short-term interest rates do not help to forecast
target changes, suggesting that interest rate forecasts of target changes occur because the
Fed reacts to interest rates.
As often happens, the purer the shock, the more unusual the response. Interest rates
move in the same direction as policy shocks, and by surprisingly large amounts. It is natural
to presume that policy shocks should lower long rates. Ellingsen and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2001) do
ﬁnd such a negative response in a narrative classiﬁcation, but at the cost that their shocks
must become predictable. Output and price responses are poorly measured, but there is no
evidence that inﬂation declines following a surprise increase in the target.
It is tempting to interpret these responses by the “price puzzle” logic. Output might rise
following a tightening, if the Fed is tightening to oﬀset a foreseen output rise. However, the
Fed cannot systematically fool the markets, so this is a diﬃcult interpretation. One must
believe that the Fed has a consistent information advantage over the private sector, which
is a diﬃcult case to make. This puzzle and the Sept 17 episode challenge our notions of a
shock. The Fed always explains its actions as a response toe c o n o m i ce v e n t s .I tn e v e rs a y s
“we added another half percent just for the heck of it.” Perhaps there are no shocks.
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10Euro Treasury
1m 3m 3m 1y 3y 10y
Yield change on target change
b 0.52 0.46 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.19
t 9.1 8.0 7.6 6.7 5.0 3.5
R2 0.39 0.32 0.28 0.24 0.15 0.08
Yield change on 1m Euro change
b 0.91 0.62 0.72 0.67 0.52
t 22.1 6.8 10.8 8.8 5.2
R2 0.87 0.54 0.63 0.55 0.39
Table 1. The left hand variable is the change in yield from 2 days before a
target rate change to 1 day after the change. The right hand variable is, in the
top panel, the target rate change itself, and in the bottom panel, the change in
the one month Eurodollar rate.
c o n s tt a r g e t3 m o2 y r5 y r 1 0 y r
b 0.29 -0.037 0.12 0.87 -0.87 0.24
t 3.1 -3.7 2.0 6.7 -3.5 1.57
Table 2. Forecast regression of target rate changes. The left hand variable
is the change in the federal funds rate target. The right hand variables are the
target, and interest rate spreads over the target two days before the change. The
regression is only run on dates where there are target changes. The R2 is 0.64.
Sample 1984-2001.
























Figure 1. Interest rates and Federal funds target in 2001. Top panel: target and one
month Eurodollar rate. Bottom panel: target and 1, 3, 5, and 10 year treasury yields.
Changes outside regular FOMC meetings are marked with a *.












Figure 2. Response of employment (top) and CPI (bottom) to fed funds shocks. The
solid lines give the response to our shocks, calculated from daily interest rates. The larger
response in the bottom panel is to the regression shock. The dashed line gives the response












Figure 3. Impact (one month) response of yields to a funds target shock.











Figure 4. Dynamic response of yields to funds shocks. Top panel: response to daily
regression shock. Bottom panel: response to CEE VAR shock. The solid lines are the target
and 3 month Eurodollar yield. The dashed lines are the 2, 5, and 10 year Treasury yields.
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